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This article presents a simple model of majority voting on tax shares in whichAbstract vo ersperceive the tax structure to be chosen as a permanent institution underw ch each voter’s tax burden will be determined throughout his or her life-time. Young voters view the choice of tax structure as a means of allocating an
anticipated tax burden over the life cycle. Middle-aged and elderly voters, on
the other hand, do have the option of lowering the tax burden on themselves
by shifting it onto younger voters. Preferences of different groups of voters and
likely majority rule outcome with respect to choice of tax structure are ex-
amined under various assumptions about lifetime income patterns and expec-
tations about the rate of public sector growth, and of population growth.
INTRODUCTION
This article presents a simple model of majority voting on tax
shares. Several assumptions are employed in developing the
model. The first is that the tax structure to be chosen by voters
is viewed by them as a permanent institution under which each
voter’s tax burden will be determined throughout his or her life-
time. The second is that each voter’s economic status varies in a
systematic way over the life cycle: all voters are given identical
lifetime income patterns and utility functions. Finally, it is
assumed that each individual’s voting behavior is guided by pure
economic self-interest. Although these assumptions are restric-
tive, they do allow certain interesting features of tax structure
choice to be isolated and examined.
Given the above assumptions, a young voter will view the
choice of tax structure not as a means of choosing his or her tax
burden relative to others, but rather as a means of allocating an
anticipated tax burden over the life cycle, 1 In addition, it seems
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reasonable to argue that the tax system preferred by the young
voter is &dquo;fair&dquo; or &dquo;just&dquo; because it allows that voter and all future
generations their most preferred allocation of tax burden over
their lifetimes.2 However, future generations cannot participate
in current political process, and at the time of choice, middle-
aged and elderly voters will not have the same preferences as
young voters. Older voters have the possibility of lowering the
tax burden over the remainder of their lifetimes by increasing the
burden on voters younger than themselves. As a result, an in-
teresting majority rule problem arises with respect to the allo-
cation of tax burden across age groups. The preferences of young
voters as well as likely majority rule outcomes with respect to
tax structure will be examined in this paper under various as-
sumptions about lifetime income patterns and expectations about
the rate of public sector growth and of population growth. The
model is developed initially without a capital market that would
enable a voter to reallocate any nominal patterns of tax pay-
ments. Implications of the presence of a capital market are
examined in a later section.
THE BASIC MODEL
Assume a society with a stable population of three voter-
taxpayers. Each individual lives for three periods, so that at any
point in time there are one young voter, one middle-aged voter
and one elderly voter. Individual utility is assumed to be a func-
tion of private consumption, C, and of the amount of a single
public good, G, provided by the government. All three indi-
viduals have have the same Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U(C,G) = CaG/3; 0 < ex, 13 < 1. [1]
An individual’s consumption during the ith period of his life
is equal to his income (Y,) minus his tax payment, (T,):
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Suppose that GNP is stable, so that the income which a young
person anticipates during the middle and elderly periods of his
lifetime is ~.l~o the income which the current middle-aged and
elderly are receiving. Assume also that individuals perceive a
stable public sector. During each period, the government is
expected to collect tax revenue amounting to TA, ~vh~ch is used
to finance G of the public good. At the time the tax structure is
chosen, a young voter-taxpayer can anticipate a lifetime indi-
viduat tax burden also equal to TA. His preferences with respect
to the tax share to be imposed on the current rpi4dle-aged and
elderly will be affected by his perception that he will also bear
that share when he is in those periods of his life. Assume initially
that income increases throughout the individual’s lifetime. The
tax structure preferred by the young voter can be derived by
assuming that the individual chooses that pattern of tax pay-
ments which maximizes the present value of the utility stream
which he will experience over his lifetime. The individual will
maximize:
subject to the following constraints:
and
With Yo < Yt < Y2, it can unambiguously be shown that the
young voter will prefer a progressive tax structure. Manipula-
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tion of the necessary conditions for maximization of 3, subject
to 4 and 5, yields the following:
T,/ Y, is the average tax rate. Therefore, given that YI+l > Y,, the
fact that the left side of equation 6 can be shown to be greater
than one, necessarily implies a preference for progression in the
tax structure.
The interests of the middle-aged and elderly voters in this
model lie in minimizing the tax burden they bear, for the re-
mainder of their lifetimes. Although there is not necessarily a
unique majority rule choice of tax structure in this example, it
does seem clear that the two older voters will always prefer a
regressive tax system over the progressive system which the
young voter would most like to see adopted. In fact, if side pay-
ments are not feasible, the middle-aged and elderly voters could
successfully impose the entire tax burden on the young voter,
assuming that this allowed that individual some minimal sub-
sistence income after taxes. The young voter could not form a
coalition with either of the other voters to alter this outcome.
If, on the other hand, there were some external, constitutional
requirement that all income be taxed in some consistent fashion,
i.e., consistently progressive, proportional or regressive, it still
seems plausible that the two older voters would unite to impose
a regressive tax. Any special exemptions from taxable income
which would be utilized primarily by older voters would also be
likely to win majority approval.
EFFECTS OF AN
ALTERNATIVE LIFETIME INCOME PATTERN
The assumption that income increases steadily throughout the
individual’s lifetime is rather unrealistic. An alternative assump-
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tion which corresponds more closely to what is observed in the
real world is that income increases between youth and middle age
but falls in the last period of the individual’s life. This lifetime
income pattern is interesting in the context of the model em-
ployed in this paper, for two reasons. First, it raises some interest-
ing questions about interpretation of the horizontal equity norm.
Second, under some circumstances, the young voter can actually
be the median voter with respect to the determination of tax
structure.
Horizontal equity requires that equals be treated equally. If
utility is employed as the relevant means of comparison, then any
tax will be consistent with the norm, at least insofar as the current
young and all future generations are concerned. This is because
of the assumption that all individuals have identical utility func-
tions and lifetime earnings patterns.3 If, on the other hand,
income is employed as the index of relative well-being, some
interesting problems arise. Suppose Yo = Y2 < Yi. Income re-
ceived during the individual’s youth is equal to the income he
anticipates during old age. A requirement that equal incomes be
taxed equally would not conform to the pattern of tax payments
that the young voter would prefer over his lifetime. Rather, the
best tax structure, from his point of view, would require a much
larger tax payment from him in his declining years than that re-
quired in his youth. To clarify, note that equation 6 remains the
necessary condition for utility maximization, despite the altered
assumption about the lifetime income pattern. Manipulation of
equation 6 yields the following:
Thus, although the difference in income between youth and
middle age is the same as the difference between the old and the
middle-aged, the young voter prefers a more progressive tax
structure with respect to relative tax rates imposed on the young
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and the middle-aged than to the relative tax rates imposed on
the elderly and the middle...aged. In fact, equation 7 suggests that
the individual might even prefer that the tax structure be propor-
tional or regressive vis-à-vis the middle and old periods of his life.
If the notion is accepted that the young voters’ preferred tax
system is the &dquo;fair&dquo; tax system, income as a determinant of equal-
ity or inequality for tax purposes, is sufficient. Age also should
be considered. Specifically, old persons with the same income as
young persons should be taxed at a higher rate. Again it would
appear that the choice of tax structure by majority rule will
defeat the equity norm. In actual practice, elderly taxpayers are
actually given preferential treatment. Given the discussion in the
preceding section, this seems a plausible outcome of majority
rule because it provides a means for middle-aged and elderly
voters to shift a greater portion of tax burden onto the young.
It is interesting to examine the implications of imposing a
rule of horizontal equity in the standard sense on the choice of
tax base. There are two relevant results. First, given this addi-
tional constraint, the young voter’s preferred tax structure is no
longer necessarily progressive, even with respect to relative tax
rates imposed on young and middle-aged taxpayers Second, the
young voter will become the median voter. If we assume Yo = Y2
and require that To = T2, the tax structure preferred by the young
voter now fulfills condition 8:
The last term on the right side of equation 8 is less than one. Thus,
even though the product of the last two terms is greater than one,’
the young voter prefers a less progressive tax structure than
before. Given the assumption that ~~ =’~,~3 the tax burden-borne
by the middle-aged voter over the remainder of his lifetime is
now tied directly to that assigned the young taxpayer. The tax
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structure preferred by the middle-aged individua7l can be derived
by maximizing:
’&dquo; ~ - -
subject to:
and:
the preferred tax structure works out to be:
Because T2 and Y2 equal To and Yo, respectively, this tax struc-
ture can be written in a manner which can be easily compared to
that preferred by a young voter. For the middle-aged voter, the
preferred distribution of tax burden between income Yo and Y; is
the following:
This can be compared to condition 8 (the tax structure pre-
ferred by the young voter). The young voter prefers a more pro-
gressive tax structure than do~;s the middle-aged voter. The
elderly voter will clearly prefer the most progressive tax structure.
Therefore, the young voter is now the median voter with respect
to choice of tax structure.
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IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC SECTOR
AND POPULATION GROWTH
Two other situations are worth examining with respect to the
effect on the young voter’s preferred tax structure. The first is the
case in which, although GNP is anticipated to remain stable, the
public sector is expected to increase over time. The second situ-
ation is that in which population is growing at some steady rate.
Two examples will be examined here: The first is that of antici-
pation by the young voter that tax rates, once set, will remain
unchanged; the second assumes that public expenditures are ex-
~ pected to remain constant.
Suppose that individuals anticipate that during their lifetimes,
although GNP will not grow, public expenditures will grow at
some steady rate 6. Suppose also that the young voter anticipates
that the tax structure chosen will be maintained insofar as to
the degree of progressivity or regressivity. This requires that
taxes be increased over time in proportion to the growth of the
public sector. Therefore, the young voter seeks that tax structure
which maximizes:
subject to:
and
Maximization of 14 is subject to the constraints in 1 ~, and 16
yields the following necessary condition:
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Comparison of 17 with equations 6 and 7 clearly suggests a
less progressive tax structure will be preferred by the young voter
if public sector growth is anticipated. This result has an intuitive
explanation. The expanding size of the public sector implies that
private consumption in any future period will be smaller under
a given tax structure than would be the case with a stable public
sector. This raises the relative marginal utility of future private
consumption. Hence, the desire for a less progressive tax struc-
ture.
Population growth has some interesting implications for tax
structure choice. Suppose that the individual’s income grows
throughout his lifetime and that population is growing at rate y.
Assume initially that the young voter anticipates that tax rates,
once set, will not be altered. Public expenditures will grow at the
same rate as population and GNP are growing (y~. With changing
size, it is important to make some assumptions about the degree
of divisibility of the good being publicly provided. If the good
is purely public (indivisible) actual public consumption enjoyed
by the individual will grow through his lifetime. If the good is
purely private (divisible), public consumption will remain cons-
tant. The expansion of public expenditures will, in this case,
be just sufficient to provide the new members of the population
with the same public consumption enjoyed by everyone else. If
the good is a congestible public good, individual consumption
will grow over time, given the assumption of constant tax rates,
but per capita consumption will grow less rapidly than expendi-
r A
tures. Replace G in the previous examples with g, to denote the
per capita public goods consumption during the i‘h period of the
individual’s life.
The younger voter now wants the tax structure which maxi-
mizes :
subject to:
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and
with Nt denoting the number of taxpayers in the relevant popu-
lation graup at the time the individual is voting on tax structure.
Given steady population growth, it is also the case the N,+l / N1 = y.
The tax structure preferred by the young voter is characterized
by the following condition:
The first two factors on the right side of equation 21 are greater
than one. However, the product of the third and fourth terms is
less than one .6 Therefore, it cannot be unambiguously determined
whether a progressive tax structure is preferred by the young
voter in this example. Comparison of 21 with 6, however, indi-
cates that a less progressive tax structure is preferred by the
young voter now than was the case with no population growth.
It is interesting to note that this model might also be adapted
to a situation in which population is stable but in which govern-
ment programs provide different consumption benefits, depend-
ing on the individual’s age. Stable population is implied by y = 1
in equation 21. (g) g+t) > I implies government programs are
youth oriented. (g, g¡+1) < 1 implies programs that are of greater
benefit to older members of the population. Youth-oriented pro-
grams strengthen the younger voters preference for progressivity.
Old age programs have the opposite effect.
Consider a second example in which the individual anticipates
that tax rates will be reduced during his lifetime in order to main-
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tain a constant level of public expenditures. The young voter now
prefer. that tax structure which maximizes 18 subject to 20 and:
The preferred tax structure is now characterized by the follow-
ing conditions;
In this case, a progressive tax structure is unambiguously
preferred as the third term on the right in both cases is equal to
or greater than one, depending on whether the good being pro-
vided is purely (or less than purdy) public. The greater the degree
of indivisibility, the less progres4ive is the preferred tax structure.
~~I~*~~~~~-~~~ OF ACCESS TO A BOND MARKET
. 
The preceding analysis was developer with the a-ssum Iola
that individual taxpayers ,n4~~,ot havl ~~~~~~ ~nl~~d ~-,
which iilogl4 -41IQw tbepl io_rmgiocatc any $hxnigai_distfibutiInaf ) 3
tax, burden oygr twit l¡{~~~. Such an a 3suMption May tio~,.~e
whoNy vnreiiih8tic irthekC&dquo;~ ihbstiptiai !u.n$4Gtións&dquo;c.-st$ ~~,
mated wtl) p#1iiiqip4tiQn in ttm bond m#qk« or .~~~ ~~~~r~ 4ft!, e.
pro~Jvxws wit# in4iyj:duals obt#i~iftI.ø~øw- I _H oxv#yg§l<
it is interesting to how c$stleas ~,vce:ss i’o a’b-o~6,d ~~~~3f
’woul4 effeót the voter%. pr-eferred distributidn of tax burjp1°
There are two separate cases to be examined hcrl, The first it
that in which the young voter anticipates that his lifetime tax
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burden will be equal to the aggregate tax burden during any single
period, i.e., the stable population / stable public expenditures situ-
ation initially discussed in this paper. Given this expectation, the
young voter would clearly prefer that lifetime pattern of taxation
which minimizes the present value of his tax burden. This would
require postponing all tax payments until the final period of his
life.7 In this example, the interests of young, middle-aged, and
elderly voters clearly conflict. The young voter’s desire to post-
pone his tax payment until the end of his life will be frustrated
by the middle-aged and elderly individuals voting to concentrate
tax burdens on the young.
! A second, interesting example arises if the young voter antici-
pates expanding public expenditures and expanding tax burden
on each age group as time progresses. In this case the young voter
would prefer that his lifetime tax burden be concentrated in the
first or last period of his life, depending on whether the interest
rate is less than or greater than the expected rate of growth of
individual tax burden in each income/age class. An example
can clarify this. Suppose, for simplicity, that voters live only two
periods instead of three, that population is stable and that public
expenditures are expected to grow 10% every year. During the
first period of the voter’s life, public expenditures total $100;
during the second period they are expected to rise to $110. The
young voter can pay $100 tax in the first period of his life and
none in the second or he can pay nothing during the first period
and levied taxes of $110 during the last period. Suppose the
interest rate is 8%. Clearly the young voter would prefer to pay
his taxes during the first period of his life. He could borrow the
$100 to meet his tax obligation and only pay $108 principal plus
interest during the second period rather than simply postponing
his tax obligation, in which case he would pay $110 during period
two. If, on the other hand the interest rate were 12%, the indi-
vidual voter would want to postpone his tax obligation until
period two. In the former example, young and old voters would
have identical preferences with respect to the allocation of tax
burden. In the latter example, their preferences would conflict.
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NOTES
1. Buchanan (1967) has also examined voter preferences with respect to tax structure
under similar assumptions.
2. For another use of this normative criterion see Browning (1975).
3. Feldstein (1976) has advanced this interpretation of the equity norm.
4. er/k (1+e-2r/ )1/k (+e = cos r > 1. I am indebted to an anony-
mous referee for pointing out an earlier error in my interpretation of this term.
5. Assume that r does not change with age.
6. 3&gamma;-k < 1; gi/g+1 &prcue; 1.
7. The voter will undoubtedly save during the earlier stages of his life in an-
ticipation of taxes to be collected when he is old. Thus, the private consumption
foregone in order to meet his tax obligation will be spread over his entire lifetime
rather than being concentrated in the last period of his life. However, the possibility
of saving at a positive interest rate reduced the total consumption which must be
given up if actual tax payment is not required until the final period of the taxpayer’s
life.
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